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A CRISIS IN COORDINATION AND
COMPETENCE
martin shubik
The ad hoc emergency approach to the current economic crisis has a great chance of wasting bil-
lions of dollars by mismatching skills and needs. The current deepening recession needs a “quick
fix” solution now, but a longer-fix solution must be put into place along with it. (See also, Policy
Note 2009/5.)
There is already considerable talk about the possible need for a large public works program
to follow the massive infusion of funds into the financial and automobile sectors. But who is going
to manage it? For us to weather this great economic storm we need to line up and coordinate (at
least) four sets of highly different talents—political, bureaucratic, financial, and industrial. With  -
out their coordination, economic recommendations, no matter how good they may appear to be
in theory, will fail in execution. 
Expectations play a critical role in a dynamic economy: they become self-fulfilling. If they
  spiral downward, they take the economy with it, accelerating any downturn; or, in boom times,
investor euphoria can lead to unduly inflated asset values. A healthy economy has to dampen both
the downward and upward swings in expectations. We are currently reaping the harvest of the
housing boom, where, once the expectation of ever-rising prices was dashed, the market promptly
nose-dived.
Most Americans wish to live in unexciting times, with prices that are more or less stable, and
public expectations reflect this desire for stability. The public neither wants nor requires learned
explanations about what has gone wrong in the economy. It simply wants the economy fixed.
Politicians on both sides of the aisle are aware that they have to cater to their constituencies now,
and are willing to risk the quick fix because political reality forces them to do so.As much as we may not like it, not only do we have to gam-
ble, but we also have to use the pool of talent and the informa-
tion we have now. This means that, in spite of public anger at
the greed of the financiers and the real possibility of   pork-
barrel spending and private profiteering from massive public
works programs, we have to enlist the help of many of the indi-
viduals associated with bringing on the crisis in the first place. 
There are a few principles that must be followed. In partic-
ular, government should not buy assets where it has neither the
technical nor the administrative ability to manage them. The
failure of financial institutions has a “fast network” (negative)
effect on national and global financial markets. Therefore, these
institutions cannot easily be placed in bankruptcy and must be
reorganized, with the government taking a senior position in
providing financial guarantees at a potential profit. Manage  ment
must also be reorganized, with the more egregious “masters of
the universe” fired but many of the mid- and upper-level man-
agers retained.
Firms that produce goods are different from those that pro-
vide services. In every instance, two questions must be asked: Is
the firm sick or healthy from the viewpoint of its ability to pro-
duce a saleable product? Is it healthy from the viewpoint of its
financial structure? Firms that are healthy by both measures need
no help. Those that are unhealthy by both measures should be
left to liquidate. Firms that have a healthy business but a bad
financial structure should be helped to reorganize. Those with
a track record of imperceptive management, such as General
Motors, should be left to either manage their own reorganiza-
tion or go bankrupt.
Bankruptcy measures, both for reorganization and for liq-
uidation, should be used decisively. A majority of the public
fears the bankruptcy of large firms because the mythology cir-
culated by both upper management and the unions is that it
will cause massive layoffs. If done well, the reverse is true: upper
management is fired, and the firm, along with many of its other
workers, is taken over by new, more efficient management. The
bankruptcy laws and procedures in the United States are prob-
ably better than anywhere else in the world; nevertheless, they
need to be made far less costly to implement than they are.
Another myth promulgated by top financial and nonfinan-
cial firms in the United States is that if we were to cap pay and
bonuses in any way for the senior managers of publically traded
firms we would ruin incentives and destroy economic innova-
tion. Let private entrepreneurs and partnerships earn what they
can, but top corporate managers who are public fiduciaries
have other responsibilities. It is doubtful that the top thousand
corporation presidents and other public company bureaucrats
will all migrate to Switzerland and Hong Kong, or that the free-
enterprise system in the United States would suffer great dam-
age even if they did.
The primary targets in a crisis such as this are employment,
consumption, and innovation. Expectations will start to change
only after it is perceived that decisive actions are being taken.
Fast, flexible weapons include tax cuts for those earning less
than $100,000 a year, deficit spending at the state and federal
levels to maintain public services and programs, and appropri-
ate reinsurance to enable the valuation of distressed assets. Less
flexible but needed are a broad revamp of credit controls and
the addition of saving incentives to cut the levels of consumer
credit card and mortgage debt. 
If the crisis deepens, pump priming via public works pro-
grams such as upgrading roads, bridges, and other public trans-
port systems in the United States may appear attractive in
rhetoric, but in reality they depend in detail not merely on the
availability of unemployed resources but also on the availability
of the right resources. If promoted without sufficient forethought,
the pork-barrel features of such projects can easily overwhelm
the benefits.
In the immediate future we must be prepared to see an
enormous explosion in entrepreneurial retraining programs and
new for-profit educational establishments bent on selling the
newly unemployed hope of acquiring a job elsewhere. Because
we have had no planning or forethought from previous admin-
istrations about a serious downturn in the economy this activ-
ity will be highly haphazard, but hopefully, despite waste and
(in some instances) blatant hucksterism, it may be better than
nothing. We have no choice but to go for short-term fixes now.
But a responsible administration, after its needed reaction to
the immediate problems, must make provisions in the institu-
tional structure to provide for early warning and thoughtful
action before the situation turns into one that requires political
reaction and patchwork fixes that can only work by serendipity.
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